IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PEND OREILLE

Eric & Mary Anderson, et al.,

Petitioners,

No. 10-2-00231-2

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v.

RESPONDENT'S MOTION and MEMORANDUM FOR PREHEARING ORDER

Sacheen Lake Water and Sewer District,

LCR 16; CR 16

Respondent.

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I. MOTION FOR CR 16 PREHEARING ORDER

Pursuant to Local Court Rule ("LCR") 16 and Civil Rule ("CR") 16, Respondent, Sacheen Lake Water and Sewer District moves this court to conduct a scheduling conference on April 28, 2011 at 1:00 p.m. and to issue a Prehearing Order with consideration for:

- (1) the simplification of the parties and issues on appeal before this court;
- (2) the sufficiency of the bond filed by each proper appellant/petitioner pursuant to RCW 57.16.090;
 - (3) the scope of the record on appeal pursuant to RCW 57.16.062 and 57.16.090;
 - (4) the standard of review pursuant to RCW 57.16.090;



- (5) the preferential and expedited scheduling of the date set for the appeal hearing; and
 - (6) the establishment of a briefing schedule for the parties' appellate briefs.

Respondent respectfully requests this court to enter a Prehearing Order addressing the issues as further set forth herein and concerning any other matter deemed necessary by the court to aid in the disposition of the action.

II. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter is an appeal of a legislative action under RCW 57.16.062, brought by approximately 115 named appellant/petitioners¹ ("Appellants") challenging the jurisdiction or authority of the Respondent Sacheen Lake Water and Sewer District ("District") to proceed with the formation of Local Improvement District #2 ("LID #2"). In the interest of simplifying the proceedings, the District requests the issuance of a Prehearing Order to clarify the nature of the proceedings, establish the scope of the official record for appellate review, define the standard for judicial review and ensure that the legislative requirement for an expedited and preferential hearing of this appeal is satisfied.

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE FORMATION OF LID #2 BY SACHEEN LAKE WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT

On September 1, 2010, the Sacheen Lake Water & Sewer District Board of Commissioners ("Board") adopted Resolution No. 10-03 expressing its intention to form

¹ The appellant/petitioners are identified in the caption individually, as couples and as groups or corporate entities. The identification of the proper status of each appellant as an owner of property within the boundaries of LID #2 is an issue to be resolved by this Court in determining the appropriate parties and appeal bonds.

LID #2 for the construction of and installation of sewer improvements within the boundaries of the proposed LID #2. (RP 2.1-2.20.) Notice of the adoption of Resolution No. 10-03 and the required public hearing on the creation of LID #2 was published in *The Newport Miner* on September 15 and 22, 2010. (RP 4.2.) The public hearing on the formation of LID #2 was scheduled for October 2, 2010. Notice of the public hearing and the intent to form LID #2 was also provided to "each owner or reputed owner of any lot, tract, parcel of land, or other property within the proposed improvement district" by mailing the notice to "the owner or reputed owner listed on the tax rolls" of the Pend Oreille County Treasurer, as required by RCW 57.16.060. (RP 1.5.)

The notices for the public hearing advised property owners within the improvement district that they had ten days following the date of the hearing to file written protests to the formation of the proposed local improvement district with the secretary of the Board of Commissioners. (RP 1.5; 4.2) RCW 57.16.060. The jurisdiction of the Board to proceed with formation of LID #2 would be "divested by protests filed with the secretary of the board within ten days after the public hearing, signed by the owners, according to the records of the applicable county auditor, of at least forty percent of the area of land within the proposed improvement district." RCW 57.16.062. If the area of land owned by protesting property owners was less than forty percent (40%) of the total area of LID #2, the Board could proceed with the formation. *Id.*

Following the public hearing and the protest period, the secretary of the Board collected, validated, and tabulated the area of land owned by protesting land owners within LID #2, arriving at a protest area of approximately 120 acres. (RP 7A.1- 7A.168;

11.1-.14). On November 3, 2010, the secretary reported to the Board that the protests represented less than 40% of the total acreage of LID #2. This was calculated by dividing the combined area of acres owned by the protesting property owners by the total area of land within the boundaries of LID #2, resulting in a protest area percentage of 35.8%. (Official Minutes, 11/3/10) The total area of land within the boundaries of LID #2 was calculated by Pend Oreille County employees and formally represented to the Board as 337.44 acres by letter dated October 26, 2010 from the Pend Oreille County Community Development Department. (RP 8.1.) On November 18, 2010, the Board adopted Resolution No. 10-04 ordering the local improvements and forming LID #2. (RP 12.1-12.7.) Notice of the adoption of Resolution No. 10-04 and formation of LID #2 was published in *The Newport Miner* on November 24, 2010. (RP 14.1.) This appeal followed.

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE APPEAL AND MOTION PRACTICE

This appeal was timely filed on December 15, 2010. On March 10, 2011, the District fulfilled the overdue obligation to file the certified transcript of the LID #2 formation proceedings with the court and filed the Transcript/Record of Proceedings.²

An Amended Transcript/Record of Proceedings was filed on March 16, 2011 to correct the absence of Bates numbers on the documents. Subsequently, and based on the oral

The delay in filing the transcript of the formation proceedings was initially due to changes in the District's legal counsel and the transfer of the records between the firms, but after late-January 2011 was due to the District's attempt to accommodate Appellants' requests to review the transcript prior to filing. When the review continued to be delayed repeatedly, the District then filed the certified transcript with the Court as required by RCW 57.16.090, billing the Appellants for the cost. The Appellants promptly paid the District for the transcript preparation cost and have thus complied with that specific procedural requirement.

agreement of counsel for the parties, Appellants filed a Note for Trial Setting and Certificate of Readiness on March 17, 2011. The court administrator issued a Notice of Trial Setting on March 31, 2011 and the appeal is presently set to be heard by the Honorable Allen C. Nielson on May 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. as a second setting on the trial docket, which means it may not be heard on that date.

Despite certifying the readiness of this matter for hearing, Appellants subsequently filed on, April 1, 2011, a Motion to Strike and Supplement the Record, a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Supplement the Record, the Declaration of Stanley M. Schwartz in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of the Record and Motion to Supplement (with five exhibits) (collectively, "Motion to Strike"), and a Declaration of Josh Shelton (with four exhibits). The Motion to Strike is set for April 28, 2011 at 1:00 p.m. with Judge Nielson.³

Rather than engaging in a piecemeal rescheduling of the Motion to Strike or additional hearings on the scope of the appeal or issues on appeal, the District has noted this Prehearing Conference to allow the parties and the Court to simplify and conform the proceedings to the statutory requirements of Ch. 57.16 RCW, establish a briefing schedule, and ensure the appeal is afforded the preferential and expedited review contemplated by the statute. Such clarification by the court will benefit the parties and the court by increasing the efficiency of the appeal and motion process, all as provided for under CR 16 and LCR 16.

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³ Counsel for the District had previously advised counsel for Appellants that she was unavailable on the April 28th hearing date. In the interest of expediency and obtaining clear procedural direction from this court, counsel for Appellants has since cancelled her conference registration and brought this Motion for Prehearing Order.

III. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

LCR 16(a) provides, "Upon the motion of a party or the court's own initiative, the presiding judge or, in the case of a preassigned case, the judge so designated will decide whether any civil case would benefit from a pretrial scheduling conference." CR 16(a) provides for the consideration of simplification of the issues, the avoidance of unnecessary proof or evidence, and "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." Based on the standard in the Civil Rules and the Local Court Rules, the District seeks a Prehearing Order addressing the following issues for the reasons set forth below.

1. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

In a unique matter such as this appeal of a legislative action to form a local improvement district, careful attention to the details of the controlling statute aids in both simplification and in the speedy disposition of the action. Here, simplification requires clarification of the proper parties to this appeal, clarification of the exact nature of the issues on appeal, and clarification of the standard for judicial review.

The statute allows property owners thirty days from the date of publication of notice of formation to appeal and challenge the jurisdiction or authority of the district to proceed by filing a lawsuit appealing the formation. RCW 57.16.062. The property owners bringing such an appeal must follow the detailed procedures set forth under RCW 57.16.090, including service of written notice of the appeal on the District secretary, filing of a minimum bond in the penal sum of \$200.00 by the appellant, and compliance with certain filing deadlines. Once the resolution has been adopted and notice published, this statutory right of appeal is the sole method by which the formation of LID #2 can be

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contested or challenged in any manner, except for an appeal of the final assessment roll under RCW 57.16.090. The starting point for judicial review of legislative acts is that a presumption of validity and regularity supports the official acts of public officials and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume they have properly discharged their official duties. <u>United States v. Chemical Found.</u>, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926).

a. Only property owners are proper parties in this appeal

RCW 57.16.062 expressly limits the persons who can bring an appeal challenging the jurisdiction or authority of the District in forming LID #2 to "property owners." Five individuals, six couples and one group are named as Appellants in the Notice of Appeal, but do not appear on the District's official list of property owners. (See generally RP 5.)

Peterson v. Cascade Sewer Dist., 20 Wn. App. 750, 753-54, 582 P.2d 895 (Div. I 1978) (overruled on other grounds, In re Des Moines Sewer Dist., U.L.I.D. No. 29, 97 Wn.2d 227, 229-30,643 P.2d 436 (1982)) instructs the court on this issue. In Peterson, the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's finding that individuals who did not own property located within the boundaries of a Utility Local Improvement District (ULID) did not have standing to appeal an assessment under former RCW 56.20.080. In particular, the court relied on the following statutory language, ""[t]he judgment shall confirm, correct, modify or annul the assessment insofar as the same affects the property of the appellant." *Id.* at 754. Based on this language, the court held that "persons not having property affected by the assessment roll have no remedy to seek in the proceeding, and hence, have no standing. The special proceeding provided by the statute may not be employed by persons not affected by the statutory roll." *Id.* RCW 57.16.090 contains the same language that the Peterson court relied upon to determine that individuals who did

not own property within the ULID did not have standing to challenge the assessment. The same analysis would apply here in determining who is a proper party to challenge the formation of an LID. The formation of LID #2 will have no effect on individuals who are not the record property owners within the boundaries of the proposed improvement district.

Absent clear evidence from these parties of their current status as owners of property within LID #2, the District requests the court to dismiss the following "Appellants" from the appeal proceedings:

Sally Fox
Lynn & Pam Herman
Eymer & Jill Holland
Susan & Blake Lindskog
Reed McGinn
John & Vickie Peick
Calvin & Linda Platz
"Sacheen Lake Concerned Property Owners"
Carl & Lyn Short
Steve Tregellas
Angela Wheat

In addition, Anna Sorenson appeals "by Judy McDonald." Although the official records reflect Ms. Sorenson is a property owner of record within LID #2, there is no record filed with this court to demonstrate Ms. McDonald's authority to initiate this appeal on Ms. Sorenson's behalf. The District requests the court to obtain clarification of this purported authority prior to the appeal hearing.

b. The Validity of the Formation of LID #2 is the Only Proper Issue on Appeal

Appellants' claim that the improvements ordered by Resolution No. 10-04 provide no special benefit must be raised on appeal of the final assessment roll and is prematurely brought at this stage. (See NOA pg. 6.) In <u>Forsgreen v. Spokane</u>, 28 Wn. App. 919, 923,

627 P.2d 118 (1981), property owners contended that their properties should not have been assessed or included within the LID because they would receive no special benefit. The court noted that "inclusion of Appellants' property within the LID was statutorily authorized. The validity or extent of the assessments can be raised only in a subsequent hearing on the assessment roll." *Id*.

In Citizens for Underground Equality v. Seattle, 6 Wn. App. 338, 342, 492 P.2d 1071 (1972), the court held that in a challenge to an LID's formation, property owners cannot "question whether the benefits are special or general." See also In re Appeals of Jones, 52 Wn.2d 143, 324 P.2d 259 (1958) (appeal from confirmation of assessment roll presents question as to whether property is specially benefited by a local improvement); Matthews v. Ellensburg, 73 Wash. 272, 279, 131 P. 839 (1913) (the argument that a water distribution system constitutes a general benefit and is of no special benefit can be urged to the council only on a hearing upon the assessment roll); Chandler v. City of Puyallup, 70 Wash. 632, 633, 127 P. 293 (1912) (the purpose of the initial hearing is "not to accord a hearing upon the validity of the assessment or as to the benefit therefrom to the property within the district, but to accord a hearing as to the limits of the district and as to whether the district should be formed at all").

Appellants also contend the formation of LID #2 was improper because the District's Comprehensive Plan had not been adopted. Appellants' counsel has previously stated this element of the appeal will be abandoned because they acknowledge it is factually incorrect.

c. The Standard of Judicial Review is Established by Statute

RCW. 57.16 establishes the process to be followed in the formation of local improvement districts by a water and sewer district and further clearly establishes the

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standards that govern the disposition of every appeal challenging the validity of the District's decision to form a local improvement district. It provides:

The judgment of the court shall confirm, unless the court shall find from the evidence that such assessment is either founded upon a fundamentally wrong basis or a decision of the board of commissioners thereon was arbitrary or capricious, or both, in which event the judgment of the court shall correct, modify, or annul the assessment insofar as it affects the property of the appellant.

RCW 57.16.090. This statutory standard of review reflects the same standard that is applied by courts whenever they review a legislative decision of an elected body, placing the heavy burden on the one challenging the legislative action to prove that the Board acted illegally and improperly. Abbenhaus v. City of Yakima, 89 Wn. 2d 855, 860-61, 576 P.2d 888 (1978). In an appeal involving decisions regarding special assessment districts like LID #2, a reviewing court looks at the propriety of the process and does not undertake an independent evaluation of the merits. Bellevue Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 108 Wn. 2d 671, 674, 741 P.2d 993 (1987). Simply put, the courts do not second-guess the decisions of elected officials acting in their legislative capacity.

In a case challenging an LID assessment roll, the Washington Supreme Court defined "arbitrary and capricious" as follows:

"Arbitrary and capricious" has a well-established meaning in this state. It refers to willful and unreasoning action, taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the action.

Where there is room for two opinions, an action taken after due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious even though a reviewing court, may believe it to be erroneous.

Abbenhaus, 89 Wn.2d at 858-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added.). See also Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 390, 378 P.2d 464 (1963) ("Arbitrary and capricious action has

been defined as willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts and circumstances. A finding of fact made without evidence in the record to support it, and an order based upon such finding, is arbitrary.")

The term "fundamentally wrong basis":

refers to some error in the method of assessment or in the procedures used by the municipality, the nature of which is so fundamental as to necessitate a nullification of the entire LID, as opposed to a modification of the assessment as to particular property.

Abbenhaus, 89 Wn.2d at 859 (quoting <u>Cammack v. Port Angeles</u>, 15 Wn. App. 188, 548 P.2d 571 (1976)). These are the appropriate judicial standards for this court to apply in reviewing and ruling on all matters in this appeal.

2. INDIVIDUAL APPELLANTS MUST EACH FILE SEPARATE APPEAL BONDS

In addition to the simplification and clarification of the parties and issues on review, there are some procedural matters that the court should address in its Prehearing Order. One is the collective filing of a single bond by all of the named Appellants and property owners. The District argues that each Appellant must deposit a separate appeal bond for the court, representative of their individual status as appellants here. Case law supports the District's position.

Appellants have only deposited with the court a single bond of \$200.00 to comply with the filing prerequisites of RCW 57.16.090.⁴ The bond provision "relates to the individual property owners making objection" to the District's action. <u>In re ULID 1 v.</u>

<u>Water Dist. 2</u>, 53 Wn.2d 270, 275, 333 P.2d 670 (1958). There is no provision in this

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I this attorney that a single bond of \$200.00 llowing the filing of the appeal on December sumentation of the deposit. Accordingly, this slief.

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statute for a "class action" appeal of formation, rather this action is necessarily a matter of individualized appeal because a protestor and an appellant must be the "property owner" according to the records of the Pend Oreille County Auditor. *Supra*; RCW 57.16.062; RCW 57.16.090.

Based on the plain language of the statute and case law, each of the valid

Appellants must be ordered to file a bond in the minimum amount of \$200, especially in
light of the stated purpose of the bond to ensure the prosecution of the appeal "without
delay." RCW 57.16.090. Further, the Washington state Supreme Court has characterized
the purpose of the bond as "to prevent harassment of commissioners by lengthy
litigation." In the Matter of An Appeal of Des Moines Sewer District, ULID No. 29, 97
Wn. 2d 227, 231, 643 P.2d 436 (1982). Absent the deposit of this nominal bond, the
individual appellants have demonstrated they have no motivation to timely proceed with
the statutory appeal hearing, nor do they have any motivation to avoid the filing of
frivolous motions and extraneous declarations designed to muddy the record and delay the
continued progress of the sewer project that the majority of property owners within the
boundaries of LID #2 support.

Accordingly, the District seeks entry of a Prehearing Order requiring each property owner of record who is a party to this appeal to deposit with the court a bond or cash security in the sum of \$200 each, and to establish a date certain for the submittal of said bond and for dismissal of the individual appeal if the bond is not deposited.

3. THE RECORD ON APPEAL MUST BE LIMITED TO THE RECORD BEFORE THE DISTRICT AT THE TIME OF THE CHALLENGED ACTION

In an appeal of the formation of an LID, judicial review is limited to the record of proceedings before the legislative body. "The reviewing court looks at the propriety of the process and does not undertake an independent evaluation of the merits." <u>Bellevue Assoc. v. Bellevue</u>, 108 Wn.2d at 674; *See also Abbenhaus v. City of Yakima*, 89 Wn.2d at 859; <u>Time Oil Co. v. Port Angeles</u>, 42 Wn. App. 473, 479, 712 P.2d 311 (1985).

[T]he superior court should be considering the material presented to the [municipality] and determining whether it adequately supports the action of the municipality. The superior court can perform this function properly and completely upon the basis of the record before the municipality.

Abbenhaus, 89 Wn.2d at 859. Further, a party objecting to an LID must first present its complaints to the municipality:

... complaining parties ... [must] place all relevant information and objections before the proper decision-making body, the council prior to the municipality's decision, instead of permitting later attack in the superior court based upon information which the municipality did not have the opportunity to consider.

<u>Id.</u> at 860 (emphasis added). Finally, Washington courts look to the record before the municipality; evidence of the purposes or motives of the members of the municipality's legislative body is inadmissible. <u>Goebel v. Elliott</u>, 173 Wash. 444, 447, 35 P.2d 44 (1934).

Despite the well established rule that the appeal must be based on the record, the Appellants have filed a Motion to Strike and Supplement the Record. This Motion to Strike seeks to fundamentally change the record and information that was before the Board of Commissioners during the period of time when they were initiating the formation of LID #2, hearing oral testimony at the October 2, 2010 public hearing, calculating the total area of LID #2, calculating the percentage of record property owners

within the boundaries of LID #2 who had filed a timely written protest, and proceeding with the adoption of Resolution No. 10-04.

Appellants' Motion is unequivocally **improper** in its effort to alter the official record before the Commissioners when they deliberated and adopted, by a formal legislative act, Resolution No. 10-04. Although the District is in the process of preparing it's response to the Motions to Strike and Supplement, it must be noted that it is precisely this type of frivolous motion practice and distortion of the issues on appeal that the Legislature must have contemplated when it required payment of the appeal bond – and that the Washington Supreme Court contemplated when it recognized the need to prevent harassment of the Board of Commissioners. RCW 57.16.090; Des Moines Sewer Dist., ULID No. 29, 97 Wn.2d at 231. The District respectfully requests entry of a Prehearing Order limiting the record on appeal to the official Transcript/Record of Proceedings for the formation of LID #2, certified by the Secretary of the District and filed with this Court on March 16, 2011.

4. THE APPEAL HEARING DATE AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE SHOULD BE EXPEDITED

The statute also contains several express provisions to expedite an appeal challenging the District's authority or jurisdiction to form LID #2. RCW 57.16.090.

These include: (1) requirement that appellant file the transcript with the Court within ten (10) days of filing the notice of appeal; (2) requirement that appellant provide written notice of filing the transcript within three days; and (3) requirement that the written notice "state a time, not less than three days from the service thereof, when the appellant will call up the cause for hearing." RCW 57.16.090. As further evidence of the Legislature's intention of expedient resolution of these matters, RCW 57.16.090 mandates that "[t]he

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appeal shall have preference over all civil causes pending with the court, except eminent domain proceedings and actions of forcible entry and detainer."

Using the schedule established by the Legislature, an appeal of the formation of LID #2 should have been heard no less than **forty-three days** after the notice of formation was published in *The Newport Miner*. We are now well over **one hundred and twenty-five days** since the publication of the notice of formation and the hearing is over a month away. Based on the convoluted and dilatory proceedings engaged in by Appellants since the initial filing of their appeal over four months ago (especially the most recent attempt to substantially alter the 1 record), it is anticipated that the issuance of an appropriate prehearing order will bring this appeal back into the speedy statutory appeal schedule contemplated by the Legislature, all in conformance with the policies of CR 16.

As noted previously, the Transcript/Record of Proceedings was filed by the District on March 10, 2011 and an Amended Transcript/Record of Proceedings was filed by the District on March 16, 2011. The Petitioner filed the Note for Trial Setting and Certificate of Readiness on March 17, 2011 and the appeal hearing is presently set for May 25, 2011, as a second setting on the trial docket. Thus, as presently scheduled it is possible that the appeal will not be heard on May 25th, but will require rescheduling if the first set trial proceeds as scheduled.

The District requests the Court to set the appeal hearing at the earliest possible date, giving it precedence over all civil causes pending, except actions for eminent domain or forcible entry and detainer. Further, the District seeks imposition of a reasonable, but limited, briefing schedule that keeps in mind the statutory presumption that three days is a

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sufficient period between filing of the Transcript/Record of Proceedings is adequate to brief the issues in this type of an appeal. The standard of review and the actual record of review are so well defined by the Legislature that briefing on the questions of whether the act of forming LID #2 was "fundamentally wrong" or "arbitrary and capricious" is all that is required. In light of the limited nature of this appeal, the District respectfully suggests that the parties file their briefs with the court five days prior to the date set for the hearing. Similarly, the District proposes that oral argument, if needed, should be limited in time to fifteen minutes per side, just as oral argument is proscribed before this State's courts of appeal.

IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

Based on the statutory requirements for an expedited hearing of the appeal challenging the authority of the District to form LID #2, the District requests the court for the entry of a Prehearing Order as follows:

- (1) Dismissal of all Appellants who are not record owners of property located within the boundaries of LID #2.
- (2) Requiring the immediate payment of the \$200 statutory appeal bond by each record owner(s) of property appealing the formation of LID #2 and providing property owners with a deadline upon which the requisite bond must be paid or face dismissal of the individual appeal.
- (3) Limiting the record on appeal only to the materials before the Board of Directors during the proceedings that constitute their legislative record and acts of

formation of LID #2, to wit, the Transcript/Record of Proceedings filed by the District on March 16, 2011.

- (4) Limiting the issues on appeal to those set forth in RCW 57.16.090, to wit:
 - a. Is the formation of LID #2 founded upon a fundamentally wrong basis;
 - b. Was the decision of the Board of Directors of the District to form LID#2 arbitrary or capricious, or both?
- (5) Establishing an expedited date for the hearing of this appeal and establishing an expedited and abbreviated briefing schedule for the respective parties.

DATED this day of April, 2011.

K&L GATES LLP

Laura D. McAloon, WSBA #31164 Thaddeus O'Sullivan, WSBA #37402 Attorneys for Respondent

Sacheen Lake Water and Sewer District

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR PREHEARING ORDER to be served upon the persons listed below in the manner indicated:

	U.S. Mail
Stanley M. Schwartz	l v
Nathan G. Smith	By Hand Delivery
WITHERSPOON - KELLEY	
422 W. Riverside Ave, Suite 1100	Overnight Delivery
Spokane, WA 99201-0300	
Spokare, WII >>201 0500	Facsimile Transmission
	racsimile transmission

Kathleen Neiman